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Background: Nigeria and Ghana have recently introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) with the aim
of moving towards universal health care using more equitable financing mechanisms. This study compares health
and economic indicators, describes the structure of each country’s NHIS within the wider healthcare system, and
analyses impacts on equity in financing and access to health care.
Methods: The World Bank and other sources were used to provide comparative health and economic data.
Pubmed, Embase and EconLit were searched to locate studies providing descriptions of each NHIS and empirical
evidence regarding equity in financing and access to health care. A diagrammatical representation of revenue-
raising, pooling, purchasing and provision was produced in order to analyse the two countries’ systems.
Results: Over the period 2000–2010, Ghana maintained a marked advantage in life expectancy, infant mortality,
under-5 year mortality, and has a lower burden of major diseases. Health care expenditure is about 5% of GDP in
both countries but public expenditure in 2010 was 38% of total expenditure in Nigeria and 60% in Ghana.
Financing and access are less equitable in Nigeria as, inter alia, private out-of-pocket expenditure has fallen from
80% to 66% of total spending in Ghana since the introduction of its NHIS but has remained at over 90% in Nigeria;
NHIS membership in Nigeria and Ghana is approximately 3.5% and 65%, respectively; Nigeria offers a variable
benefits package depending on membership category while Ghana has uniform benefits across all beneficiaries.
Both countries exhibit improvements in equity but there is a pro-rich and pro-urban bias in membership.
Conclusions: Major health indicators are more favourable in Ghana and overall equity in financing and access are
weaker in Nigeria. Nigeria is taking steps to expand NHIS membership and has potential to expand its public
spending to achieve greater equity. However, heavy burdens of poverty, disease and remote settings make this a
substantial challenge. Ghana’s relative success has to be tempered by the high number of exemptions through
taxation and the threat of moral hazard. The results and methods are anticipated to be informative for policy
makers and researchers in both countries and other developing countries more widely.
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In the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, health care has
evolved along a variety of different lines, which has led
to systems today that exhibit a great deal of fragmenta-
tion and complexity [1]. In recent years there has been a
trend for many developing countries to move towards a
new or expanded role for various forms of social health
insurance (SHI), including Nigeria and Ghana [2], in the
pursuit of universal health care as championed by the
World Health Organisation (WHO) [3]. The principal
aim is to reduce the high dependency on out-of-pocket
(OOP) payments in the form of user charges and co-pay-
ments, which are regressive as they disproportionately
affect the poorest in society, and therefore challenge the
underlying tenets of equity within healthcare systems [1,4].
The evolution of the National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS) in Nigeria dates back to the post-independence
era of 1962 [5]. The government initially funded universal
and free health care in predominantly public facilities
using revenues from oil exports and general taxation.
However, the global slump in oil prices in the 1980s meant
that the Government could no longer afford to provide
free health care. Several cost recovery mechanisms based
on OOP charges were introduced in conjunction with a
growth in the privatisation of health care [1]. In addition,
the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme
in 1986 reduced the health sector budget. Additional pres-
sures that led to the introduction of the NHIS included: (1)
the general poor state of the nation’s health care services,
(2) the excessive dependence and pressure on government-
provided health facilities, (3) dwindling funding of health
care in the face of rising costs, and (4) poor integration of
private health facilities in the nation’s health care delivery
system [5]. In terms of implementation [6], the National
Council on Health (NCH) approved re-packaging to
ensure full private sector participation in the scheme and
legislation was signed in May, 1999. The NHIS of Nigeria
came into full operation in 2005. Its principal aim is to
secure ‘universal coverage and access to adequate and af-
fordable healthcare in order to improve the health status of
Nigerians, especially for those participating in the various
programmes/products of the Scheme’ [5].
Ghana shares a similar post-colonial history to Nigeria
in terms of health care in the country [7,8]. After inde-
pendence in 1957, the Ghanaian government also intro-
duced a tax-based health financing system in which
services were provided free at the point of use by the pub-
lic sector. By the early 1970s, however, the effects of a
stagnating economy meant that the government could not
sustain this mode of health financing and delivery. Like
Nigeria, the government introduced nominal user fees in
the public sector, which in 1985 were raised significantly
with the aim of recovering at least 15% of recurrent
expenditure. This user fee system, known by the term‘cash and carry,’ had negative consequences in access to
health services, especially for the poorest in Ghanaian
society. Limitations included long delays in accessing
health services and incomplete prescription purchases. In
2001 the Ghanaian Government passed legislation which
established its own NHIS in 2004, with the aim of achie-
ving universal coverage for the population as a whole.
Although these systems have a short history, there is
much interest among policy makers regarding their impact
on equity and the potential they offer in moving towards
universal coverage. The aim of this study is to compare
health and economic indicators, describe the structure of
each country’s NHIS within the wider healthcare system,
and analyse impacts on equity in financing and access to
health care. Ghana was selected as a comparator country
for Nigeria as evidence suggests that differences may exist
in the level of achievement between these two countries
[9]. It is anticipated that the results will provide insights to




Searches of Pubmed, Embase and EconLit were under-
taken and based on the Boolean expression: [social OR
national OR health] AND [insurance OR health care]
AND [Nigeria OR Ghana OR Africa OR Sub-Saharan
Africa]. The inclusion criteria were that papers should
provide either descriptions of the NHIS of the two coun-
tries, or provide empirical evidence of equity in finan-
cing, access or health care utilisation in the two systems.
The selected date range was 2000–2012 due to the fact
that NHIS introduction occurred post-2000 in both
countries. Searches of the bibliographies of included
references revealed further studies that were retrieved.
Other relevant references or sources that provided key
demographic, health and economic data were also uti-
lised - principally on-line websites of the World Health
Organisation (WHO), the World Bank and the official
NHIS websites of Nigeria and Ghana. For this analysis a
10-year period (2000–2010) was used to reveal any im-
portant trends in the data since the introduction of the
NHIS in Nigeria and Ghana. The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) mean
was reported to provide an indication of the potential of
each country to develop. The final selection of studies
was agreed by the two co-authors.
Analytical framework
We utilise two well-established definitions of equity
[2,10], namely (1) horizontal equity, which represents
the degree to which people who are equals are treated
equally; this can apply to access, financial contributions,
health services utilisation or health outcomes although
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ment and human biology in addition to the healthcare
system of a country [11], (2) vertical equity, which repre-
sents the degree to which people who are different are
treated differently.
In terms of equity in financing, the concepts of pro-
gressivity (whereby payments, as a proportion of income,
increase with income) and regressivity (when payments,
as a share of income, decrease with income and there-
fore disproportionately affect lower income groups) have
been established in seminal studies of OECD countries
[10]. Although each country has to be assessed indivi-
dually, the following general principles can be deter-
mined: (1) OOP expenditures are regressive, (2) direct
taxation is usually progressive except when tax rates are
low, (3) indirect taxes are usually regressive, (4) free
market private health insurance is regressive when it
plays a dominant or compulsory role, but can be pro-
gressive when supplementary to public systems, and (5)
statutory SHI is usually (but not always) progressive
depending on how contributions are determined.
To represent and describe each NHIS within their re-
spective healthcare systems, two diagrams were devel-
oped by the authors using the WHO framework of
Murray and Frenk [12]. This framework can be used to
present the degree of integration or segmentation (bothTable 1 Key demographic, health and economic indicators - N












123.7 371 48 47 116
Ghana 2000 19.2 260 58 59 64
Nigeria
2002
129.8 455 47 48 107
Ghana 2002 20.1 306 58 60 61
Nigeria
2004
136.4 644 48 49 102
Ghana 2004 21.1 420 60 61 58
Nigeria
2006
143.3 1,014 49 50 97
Ghana 2006 21.1 920 61 63 55
Nigeria
2008
150.7 1,374 50 51 93
Ghana 2008 23.3 1,226 62 64 53
Nigeria
2010
158.4 1,278 51 52 88
Ghana 2010 24.4 1,325 63 65 50
OECD 2010 N/A 34,774 77 82 6.8
Notes: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; LE = lif
U-5 year MR is per 1,000 live births; p-HIV = prevalence of HIV % of population ag
(in 2012 US$); THE = total health care expenditure; p.cap = per capita; OOP = Outvertically and horizontally) of the four components of
any healthcare system; namely revenue collection, poo-
ling, purchasing and provision. This general approach is
now widely used in the literature [13,14] but the
addition of diagrams facilitates easy assimilation for the
reader of how the four functions are either linked or
separated from one another.
Results
The results for all the demographic, economic and health
economic indicators over the period 2000–2010 are pro-
vided in Table 1. From a total of 147 studies reporting
equity issues retrieved by searches, eight met the inclusion
criteria for Nigeria and eight for Ghana. The results of
these are summarised in the relevant NHIS sections and
provided in detail within Tables 2 and 3.
Demographics
Nigeria is a Lower Middle-Income Country (LMIC) in
West Africa [15] with a population that has risen from
123.7 million in 2000 to158.4 million in 2010. 48.1% of
the population live in rural areas and 51.9% in urban
areas [16]. Ghana is also a LMIC country [15] in West
Africa but has a much smaller population that rose from
19.2 million in 2000 to 24.4 million in 2010. Like Nigeria
















186 3.9 172 17 4.7 33 93
99 2.3 152 19 7.2 41 80
177 3.8 182 18 4.0 26 90
94 2.2 138 20 6.5 36 80
168 3.7 180 44 7.0 32 95
88 2.1 125 26 6.3 35 80
159 3.6 168 59 5.7 34 96
83 1.9 112 48 4.4 57 65
151 3.6 145 80 5.7 41 95
79 1.8 99 68 5.6 58 67
143 3.6 133 63 5.1 38 95
74 1.8 86 67 5.2 60 66
8.2 0.3 N/A 4,365 12.6 65 67
e expectancy at birth; IMR = infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births;
ed 15–49; i-TB = incidence of TB per 100,000; GDP = Gross Domestic Product
of pocket. Source: World Bank [15].
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per capita (US$) rising from $371 in 2000 to $1,278 in
2010 for Nigeria. The annual growth rate for 2010 was
an impressive 8.7%. Similar levels of growth are observed
for Ghana, rising from $260 in 2000 to $1,325 in 2010.
The annual growth rate for 2010 was also impressive at
7.7%. The OECD mean was $34,774 in 2010, which
reflects the potential for further growth in the econo-
mies of Nigeria and Ghana.
Health indicators
The six health indicators in Table 1 provide a useful
overview of the two countries as they are commonly
used in international comparisons [17]. Three variables
form part of the eight health-related United Nations’
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [18].
In 2000 life expectancy in Nigeria was 48 years for males
and 49 years for females. The corresponding figures for
Ghana were 58 and 59 years, respectively. Both countries
experienced year-on-year rises and in 2010 life expectancy
for males in Nigeria increased to 51 years compared with
63 years in Ghana, and female life expectancy had risen to
52 years in Nigeria and 65 years in Ghana. The greater ad-
vantage for Ghana has therefore been maintained or
expanded over the period of analysis. For comparison, the
OECD mean in 2010 was 77 years for males and 82 for
females.
Infant mortality rate and under-5 year child mortality
rate are closely related and linked to the 4th MDG,
which is to reduce the under-5 child mortality rate of
each country by two thirds between 1990 and 2015 [18].
In Nigeria for 2000, infant mortality rate per 1,000 live
births was 116 and under-5 mortality was 186. Ghana
shows a substantial advantage with figures of 64 and 99,
respectively. Over the period 2000–2010, Nigeria and
Ghana experienced year-on-year improvements such
that in 2010 infant mortality rate and under-5 mortality
rate fell to 88 and 143 for Nigeria, respectively, and for
Ghana the figures were 50 and 74, respectively. Using
World Bank health data [15] the target MDG for 2015
can be calculated to be 70 deaths per 1,000 live births
for Nigeria as it was 213 in 1990, which means conside-
rable progress is needed in order to meet this goal [18].
Using the same calculation, Ghana is making good pro-
gress to meet its target of 40 in 2015, from 122 in 1990,
but again this will be a major challenge to achieve [19].
The OECD mean for these two variables in 2010 was 6.8
and 8.2 per 1,000 live births, respectively.
In terms of major disease burden indicators, Table 1
reports the prevalence of HIV as a percentage of the
population aged 15–49, and the incidence of tubercu-
losis (TB). These variables are closely linked with MDG
goal 6 which is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other
diseases. In Nigeria, HIV prevalence fell from 3.9% to3.6%, and the incidence of TB fell from 172 to 133 cases
per 100,000. For Ghana, HIV prevalence fell from a
lower base of 2.3% to 1.8%, and the incidence of TB fell,
again from a lower base of 152 cases to 86 cases per
100,000 in 2010. Data from the World Bank indicate
that, in 2008, the number of new cases of malaria per
100,000 of population was 38,259 for Nigeria and 31,179
for Ghana.
The general pattern, therefore, is that Nigeria has a
higher disease burden but a good deal of progress is
being made for both countries.
Health expenditure indicators
The health expenditure indicators in Table 1 are chosen
to reflect three aspects of funding: (1) the level of commit-
ment governments have towards the funding of health
care, (2) the level achieved per capita, which reflects the
economic strength of a country in relation to the size of
its population, (3) public health expenditure as a share of
total health expenditure, which reflects the level of gov-
ernment financing of health care, and (4) the percentage of
private health expenditure provided by OOP contributions,
which reflects the contributions made by individuals.
Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP
increased from 4.7% in 2000 to 5.1% in 2010 for Nigeria,
but an inconsistent trend is observed in that it reached 7%
in 2004 but had fallen to 5.7% in 2006 and 2008. In con-
trast, Ghana was spending 7.2% on health in 2000 but in
2010 this had fallen to a similar figure to Nigeria at 5.2%.
Compared with the OECD mean of 12.6%, the level for
both Nigeria and Ghana is less than half that of developed
countries. The data for per capita total health care expend-
iture indicate that in 2000 Nigeria spent US$ 17 and Ghana
US$ 19, which generally rose year-on-year in both coun-
tries to reach US$ 63 in Nigeria and US$ 67 in Ghana.
Data for public health expenditure as a percentage of
total health expenditure indicate a large difference. In
Nigeria the figure rose slightly from 33% in 2000 to 38%
in 2010, while in Ghana the respective figures were 41%
and 60%. This reveals a much stronger role for the gov-
ernment in Ghana in terms of funding health care and
much closer to the 65% achieved in OECD countries. It
should be noted that since the introduction of the NHIS
in Ghana (2004) public expenditure has risen quite
sharply from 35% to 60% while in Nigeria a more mod-
est increase is observed from 32% to 38% over the same
period.
The final column of Table 1 reports the percentage of
private expenditure that comes from OOP sources in
the form of user charges and/or co-payments for treat-
ment. In Nigeria for 2000 this was very high at 93% but
even higher (95%) in 2010. In contrast, OOP expendi-
ture was 80% in 2000 for Ghana until the introduction
of the NHIS in 2004, and fell sharply to 66% by 2010.





Sample/s Principal results Conclusions
Adeniyi,
2010 [35]
Assess the knowledge &
perceptions of Nigerian







clinics in Lagos State
61.1% had a fair knowledge of
NHIS; 70.4% said NHIS will
succeed if properly
implemented; 76.6% believed
NHIS will improve access to oral
health services; 71.4% improve
affordability, 68.3% improve
availability of services. 74.4%
said NHIS oral health care
unacceptable.
The majority of the dentists
involved in this study had some
knowledge of the NHIS and
were generally positively
disposed towards the scheme
and viewed it as a good idea.
Dienye,
2011 [27]
Determine the pattern of
hospital bill payment among









in Ngo; 80% fish
farmers & 86% of
Christian religion
Multiple sources of finance
were used: personal savings
(71%), family (49%),
organisations (31%), loans
(16%), sale of property (30%).
Only 3% had knowledge of
NHIS, but 84% were willing to
enrol.
Sources of finance for payment
were multiple but the most
common were personal savings
& family members. A low
knowledge of NHIS contrasted




Investigate the costs of illness
to households in different












Malaria was the most common
illness. Average cost of
transportation for malaria was
86 Naira ($0.6 US), & the total
cost of treatment = 2,819.9
Naira ($20 US); drug costs
contributed > 90%. OOP
payment was the main method
of payment. Treatment costs
differed by geographic location
and SES.
There is the need to substitute
OOP spending with pre-
payment mechanisms, with
cross-subsidies from the rich to
the poor & from the healthy to
the unhealthy. This can be
achieved by expanding NHIS
for vulnerable groups, informal




Assess the contribution of
NHIS to health care delivery;
evaluate participation in and





the formal sector in
Lagos State
11% saw cost as a barrier to
membership; 36% had not
heard of NHIS; NHIS users were
31.6% in 2006; Concern raised
about HMOs & providers;
gender, age, income, marital
status, family size, education &
occupation were significant
explanatory variables of NHIS
participation.
Low awareness affects NHIS
participation and need to
promote access, particularly
among educated couples.


















than one year in
Zaria-Nigeria
High satisfaction rate with NHIS
= 42.1%. Marital status, general





hospital visits and duration of
enrolment slightly influenced
satisfaction.
The findings have assisted
amendment re-prioritization of
the operation of the NHIS.
Future planning efforts should
consider client satisfaction and
the factors which influenced it





attitude of civil servants in











40% were aware of NHIS
through mainly TV/ billboards.
None had good knowledge of
the components of NHIS, 26.7%
knew about its objectives, 30%
knew about who should benefit
from the scheme. OOP = 74.7%
of health care spending. 0.3%
have benefited from NHIS but
52.5% agreed to participate in
the NHIS.
A significant association exists
between willingness to
participate in the NHIS scheme
and awareness of methods of
options of health care financing















Malaria & hypertension were
major diseases requiring OPD
and IPD. Providers: PMDs
(41.1%), private hospitals
Inequities exist in use providers
& expenditures on treatment.
Reforms should decrease
barriers to access public &
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Rural dwellers & poorer SES
groups mostly used low-level &
informal providers. Monthly
expenditure in urban area =
2444 Naira (US$20.4) & 2267
Naira (US$18.9) in rural area.
formal health services & identify
constraints which impede the
equitable distribution and
access for poor & rural dwellers.
Oyibo, 2011
[34]











62.8% reported illness in their in
previous 4 weeks; 69% of these
used OOP payments, 28.4%
used NHIS, 2.6% borrowed
money. 63.6% of OOP users had
difficulties accessing quality
health care; 47.7% used self-
medication, 28.4% delayed
seeking treatment, 17.1% used
herbalists, 6.8% ignored illness.
Most government employees
and their dependants in
Abakaliki have difficulties in
accessing quality health care
services with OOP payments.
This leads to negative health
and access consequences. NHIS
enrolees had little difficulty
accessing health care.
Notes: NHIS = National Health Insurance Scheme; OPD = Out-patient department; IPD = In-patient department; PMD = Patent medicine dealers;
SES = Socio-economic status.
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the figure for Ghana.
These findings suggest that the financing of health
care in Ghana has become less regressive since the
introduction of the NHIS, whereas in Nigeria very high
OOP payments as a share of private health expenditure
have persisted.
The NHIS of Nigeria and Ghana within their respective
healthcare systems
Figure 1 provides an overview of the Nigerian healthcare
system while Figure 2 illustrates the system for Ghana.
The shaded areas highlight the principal NHIS elements.
As can be seen, there are six elements that contribute to
the four healthcare system functions of revenue raising,
pooling, purchasing and provision, which are described in
the following sections. Providers include primary care pro-
viders, hospitals (secondary care, tertiary care), pharma-
cists, chemical shops, maternity clinics, opticians, dentists,
diagnostic centres, laboratories and traditional healers
(which are common in both Nigeria and Ghana). Provi-
ders shown as shaded rectangles are accredited by the
NHIS. For simplicity, government-funded provision is
shaded as providers are either part of the NHIS (as in ter-
tiary care hospitals, for example) or potentially part of the
future NHIS. As the first five elements are common to
both countries, they will be described before the NHIS
elements.
Out of pocket (OOP) payments
OOP expenditure is represented by the block of vertical
tubes on the right-hand side of Figures 1 and 2. These
are horizontally segmented from each other and verti-
cally integrated to the point of purchasing, and depict
households or individuals. Pooling can usually only
occur among family members and so has limited effecton risk sharing. In Nigeria, the level of OOP expenditure
as a share of total health expenditure is very high at
around 65% [5]. The figure for Ghana is somewhat lower
at about 45% [1].
Evidence from an empirical analysis of OOP payments
in Ghana, but generalizable to other similar countries,
confirms their regressive characteristic [20]. As such verti-
cal and horizontal equity in financing are more adversely
affected by OOP payments in Nigeria than Ghana.
Private Health Insurance (PHI)
PHI here refers to that provided by free market insur-
ance companies who are not within the NHIS. As shown
in Figures 1 and 2, a number of vertically integrated and
horizontally segmented companies compete for custo-
mers. In the case of Nigeria, some private insurance
companies are fully integrated from revenue-raising to
provision as they manage their own hospitals or clinics,
which appears not be as prevalent in Ghana [21]. The
diagrams, however, indicate the most common arrange-
ment of a purchaser-provider split. PHI companies do
not pool their revenues with each other to equalise risk.
PHI is utilised by a small percentage of the population
who may use it to seek faster access to health care, more
choice of provider and higher quality facilities. In 2003,
before implementation of the NHIS, only 6.7 % of pri-
vate health expenditure was attributed to private pre-
paid insurance plans in Nigeria and current data suggest
this amounts to less than 1% (one million people) [22].
In Ghana it appears to have remained at under 1% of
the population pre-and post-NHIS implementation
[1,23]. Free market PHI often adversely affects equity
because of the regressive nature of actuarially fair pre-
miums (set according to risk) and flat rate co-payments
and deductibles. Evidence from five African countries,
including Ghana and Nigeria, suggests that the uptake of






Sample/s Principal results Conclusions
Akazili,
2011 [20]
Analyse the distribution of
health care financing in










Financing is progressive due
to progressivity of taxes (50%
of funding). NHI levy is mildly





(45% of funding) are
regressive.
Extension of pre-payment
cover to all in the informal
sector is needed - possibly
through tax. The pre-payment
funding pool for health care
needs to grow so budgetary




Analyse strategies to identify
poor for exemptions: means








setting: urban, rural and
semi-urban in Ghana
Cost of exempting one poor
individual = US$15.87 to US
$95.44; MT was most efficient
and equitable in rural and
urban settings with low-
poverty incidence; GT was
optimal in the semi-urban
setting with high-poverty
incidence. PMT and PWR were
less equitable and inefficient
although feasible in some
settings.
MT is recommended in low-
poverty urban and rural
settings and GT is optimal
strategy in high-poverty semi-
urban setting. The study is
relevant to other low-income
countries that require
identification and exemptions






perceptions of insured &
uninsured on NHIS; Explore
association with decisions to





Household survey of 3,301
households and 13,865
individuals
Scheme factors have the
strongest association with
voluntary enrolment & retention
in NHIS (benefits, convenience
& price) of NHIS. Negative on
price of NHIS, provider attitudes
and peer pressure. The
uninsured are more negative
about these factors.
Perceptions about providers,
scheme factors & community
attributes are important in
household decisions to
voluntarily enrol in the NHIS.
Policy makers need to design





Evaluate equity in enrollment







Household survey of 3,301
households
Evaluation included: quality of
care, service delivery, provider
attitudes, benefits, price &
convenience of NHIS, peer
pressure & attitudes.’ Results
show evidence of inequity as
differences exist between the
rich and the poor.
Better identification of the
poor is needed & premium
exemptions should be
aggressively pursued. Scheme
factors influence decisions to
enrol & quality of care should
be addressed to retain the
rich. SES is a significant factor.
Mensah,
2010 [44]
Evaluate MDGs 4 & 5 for
mothers who are enrolled in
the NHIS compared with




Women (18–49 years) from
Brong Ahafo and Upper
East. 400 NHIS members
&1,600 non-members
NHIS women are more likely
to receive prenatal care,
deliver at a hospital, have
their deliveries attended by
trained health professionals,
and experience less birth
complications.
The NHIS is an effective tool
for improving health
outcomes among those who






Evaluate the impact of the









Household survey in two
rural districts, Nkoranza and
Offinso
NHIS coverage (2007) was 35%;
OOP payment for care from
informal sources & for
uncovered drugs and tests
occurred in NHIS but
significantly less than the
uninsured. Effect was strong
among the poorest in the
sample.
NHIS gives a positive financial
protection effect, stronger
among the poor. Social health
insurance cannot fully remove
OOP payments. Further work
is needed on supply-side










Residents of the Asante
Akim, north district of the
Ashanti region (99 villages,
7,223 households)
38% subscribed to the NHIS, of
these 21% were low, 43%
middle and 60% high SES
households. SES was
significantly associated with
NHIS subscription (high SES:
Odds Ratio [OR] = 4.9 low SES
OR = 1, reference group).
To achieve universal access to
health care facilities for all
residents of Ghana, in
particular for individuals living
under socio-economic
constraints, increasing their
subscription rates is necessary.
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Table 3 Summary of empirical studies evaluating relevant equity issues for the NHIS (Ghana) (Continued)
Witter,
2009 [30]
Assess the NHIS (2005 to
2009) to inform NHIS
developments & other









regional and district levels
NHIS is reliant on tax (70–
75%); large exempted
population (30%) ; coverage
rose from 7% to 45%; growth
in distressed schemes; VAT-
based source is regressive;
membership of NHIS is pro-
rich & pro-urban; ‘squeezing




Some trade-offs will be
necessary to achieve universal
coverage. In the long term,
investment in the NHIS will
only be justified if it is able to
increase the cost-effectiveness
of purchasing and the
responsiveness of the system
as a whole.
Notes: NHIS = National Health Insurance Scheme; OPD = Out-patient department; IPD = In-patient department; PMD = Patent medicine dealers; SES = Socio-economic
status; OOP = out-of-pocket;MDG = Millenium Development Goal; VAT = Value-added Tax; OR = Odds Ratio.
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from urban communities [21].
Community-based Health Insurance (CBHI)
CBHI has been a common feature of health care finan-
cing in Nigeria and Ghana, especially within the poorer
rural communities [24]. Also known as Mutual Health
Associations (MHAs), CBHI is not-for-profit health in-
surance with members regularly paying small premiums
into a collective pool of funds, which are then used to
pay for health services that members require. Although
CBHI may involve hundreds of programmes it only
accounts for a very small portion of total health expen-
diture - for example in Ghana it was only 1% in the early
2000s [1] although the actual number of CBHI schemes
grew from 2 in 1995 to 78 in 2004 [21]. Whilst legally
mandated to operate, CBHI programmes in Ghana that
are outside the NHIS do not receive funding for
exempted citizens [25], which may act as a driver for
providers to seek accreditation by NHIS programmes as
a way of scaling up health insurance coverage.
In terms of equity in financing, CHBI offers limited
opportunities to raise sufficient funds for pooling and
risk sharing due to the often low enrolment of target
populations; one reported study of West African coun-
tries showed this varied from 8-82% [24]. Flat-rate pay-
ments are mostly used and are therefore regressive. In
terms of the package of benefits offered, this can vary
widely and may be limited to out-patient care at primary
health care facilities [1]. Some findings also suggest that
policies intended to promote equity can lead to a reduc-
tion in quality of services and that adverse selection (of
higher risk participants) is often a feature due to the vo-
luntary nature of CBHI [24].
Donor Funding (DF)
DF, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, is an important form of
revenue-raising for many developing countries such as
Nigeria and Ghana, and comes in the form of grants and
loans from various external sources [3]. These include
contributions from countries with bilateral agreements,multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the
WHO, global health initiatives, and charities or philan-
thropic organizations. In Figures 1 and 2, DF is shown
entering the system either at various government levels to
add to the public pool of funds for health care, or passed
directly to community programmes at the level of pur-
chasing. In some cases, however, organisations make use
of their own resources on the ground as an additional
source of provision. While this is often targeted at specific
programmes and agencies such as non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), in terms of supporting health care
as a share of total spending it constituted 4.9% in Nigeria
and 14% in Ghana for 2009 [15].
The potential effect of DF is to increase both horizon-
tal and vertical equity in financing and access to health
care facilities, particularly for those in poor rural areas.
Government
The government clearly plays a significant role in the
health care sector by raising both direct and indirect
taxes and allocating part of it to fund health care.
In the case of Nigeria, it has judicial, legislative and
executive arms of government at Federal and 36 State
levels. There are 774 LGAs and 9,572 political wards.
The three arms of government in Nigeria (Figure 1) have
a degree of horizontal and vertical segmentation bet-
ween them [26]. The Federal Government collects taxes
and allocates the health budget to the Ministry of Health
(MoH). Allocations are then made to Federal govern-
ment for the purchasing and provision of public tertiary
care across the country with some overlap regarding pri-
mary care programmes. State governments also receive
and pool funds to purchase secondary care public faci-
lities, while LGAs receive and pool funds to purchase
public facilities in the primary care sector. Some funding
is shown being passed to the NHIS programme (shaded
arrow) to cover exempted groups such as children under
5, the permanently disabled and prison inmates [5]. Col-
lectively, the providers created by the three arms of go-
vernment contribute to the stock of providers that
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NHIS-accredited and non-accredited providers: public and private; primary, secondary and tertiary;
pharmacies, opticians, dentists; traditional healers. Access  to providers can potentially be via any payer category
Figure 2 The NHIS of Ghana: revenue raising, pooling, purchasing and provision. Source: Developed by the authors based on Murray and
Frenk [12] and studies/references from the review. Notes: The relative size of each element does not equate to population size; Shaded boxes =
NHIS elements; NHIS = National Health Insurance Scheme; SSNIT = Social Security and National Insurance Trust; DMHIS = District Mutual Health























NHIS-accredited and non-accredited providers: public and private; primary, secondary and tertiary;
pharmacies, opticians, dentists; traditional healers. Access  to providers can be via any payer category
Figure 1 The NHIS of Nigeria: revenue raising, pooling, purchasing and provision. Source: Developed by the authors based on Murray and
Frenk [12] and studies/references from the review. Notes: The relative size of each element does not equate to population size; Shaded boxes =
NHIS elements; NHIS = National Health Insurance Scheme; FSHIP = Formal Sector Social Health Insurance programme; USSHIP = Urban Self-
Employed Social Health Insurance Programme; RCSHIP = Rural Community Social Health Insurance Programme; DF = Donor Funding; CBHI =
Community-Based Health Insurance; PHI = Private Health Insurance; OOP = Out-of-pocket, T.C. = Tertiary care; S.C. = Secondary care; P.C. =
Primary care; LGA = Local Government Authority; HMO = Health Maintenance organisation; MoH = Ministry of Health.
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provision is shown in Figure 1 as all arms of government
mostly run their own facilities and, for simplicity, no
purchaser-provider split is shown.
A recurring criticism relates to the small amount allo-
cated to the health budget in Nigeria - in 2003, for ex-
ample, it was only 3.2%, which has implications for equity
within the system regarding the quantity and quality of
health care resources [6,27]. The Abuja summit of 2001
called for African governments to commit 15% of annual
government budgets to their health sectors [28]. In the
case of Nigeria, therefore, this target remains to be met.
Figure 2 shows that Ghana is divided into ten adminis-
trative/political regions, which are further divided into
170 District Authorities (DAs). The DAs develop, plan
and mobilize resources for programmes and strategies
for the development of the district [29]. Tax contributes
about 70% of the funding envelope for the NHIS of
Ghana [30] and as such is more strongly integrated with
the NHIS compared with Nigeria. The Government has
also met the Abuja target of allocating 15% of its budget
to health care, which includes NHIS funding [30].
As shown in Figure 2, , pooled taxation funds are allo-
cated to State governments and then DAs, which pur-
chase public health care facilities in primary, secondary
and tertiary care and can be accessed, as in the case of
Nigeria, via the same categories of provider shown in
Figure 2. As in the case of Nigeria and for simplicity, it
is assumed that vertical integration exists down to
provision in the non-NHIS sector but some contracting
arrangements may involve a purchaser-provider split.
NHIS (Nigeria)
The role of the NHIS is to regulate, monitor, enforce
quality controls and administer the system, including
care to the disadvantaged sectors in Nigerian society
[5,31]. As can be seen in Figure 1, the NHIS (shaded
boxes) is built around three main sub-schemes to cater
for different segments of the population:
 The Formal Sector Social Health Insurance
Programme (FSHIP);
 The Urban Self-Employed Social Health Insurance
Programme (USSHIP);
 The Rural Community Social Health Insurance
Programme (RCSHIP)
The FSHIP was the first scheme to be rolled out in
2005 and covers the public sector, organised private sec-
tor (employers with more than10 employees), the armed
forces, Police and allied services, students of tertiary
institutions, and voluntary contributors. The FSHIP is
implemented by Health Maintenance Organisations
(HMOs) and NHIS-accredited providers. HMOs arevertically integrated in revenue-raising, pooling and pur-
chasing, but horizontally segmented from each other. A
purchaser-provider split therefore generally exists but
some HMOs also run hospitals or clinics. HMOs can ei-
ther be for-profit or not-for profit private health insur-
ance companies, or public entities. They operate within
a competitive framework under the model of ‘managed
care,’ which has its roots in the United States as a poten-
tially more cost-effective way of delivering health care in
comparison with free market PHI [11,31].
In terms of operation [5], employers affiliate with an
NHIS-approved HMO which provides employees (under
the age of 60) with a list of NHIS-approved Health Care
Providers (HCPs). The employee registers all family
members with a HCP of his/her choice and also has the
right to change his/her HCP after a minimum period of
three months if he/she is not satisfied with the services
being given. Contributors and associated dependents are
given an identity card with which to obtain health care
after a specified waiting period.
Revenue-raising in the FSHIP is shared by the employer
and employee, who pay 10% and 5% of the employee’s
basic salary, respectively [5]. Contributors may be asked to
make a small co-payment, where applicable, at the point
of service. Revenue-raising in the FSHIP is therefore rea-
sonably equitable but is likely to be regressive overall be-
cause of proportional contributions in respect of income
with flat rate co-payments and user charges.
Fund pooling, as shown in Figure 1, exists within indi-
vidual HMOs in order to share risk among its members
and make necessary payments. As membership of HMOs
varies quite considerably, however, from less than a thou-
sand to tens of thousands [31], the potential to benefit
from pooling is somewhat variable. The NHIS in Nigeria
has not implemented ‘risk equalisation’ among HMOs – a
process that involves financial transfers from insurance
companies with a low-risk membership to those with
older or sicker members as practiced in controlled market
insurance schemes. An example of such mechanisms in
developing countries is that of South Africa [13,14].
In terms of purchasing, the HMO makes payments to
the HCP for services rendered using one of five alterna-
tives: (1) capitation, which involves regular payments in
advance of treatment based on membership size, (2) fee-
for-service, which is mostly applicable to private providers
based on ‘authorised referrals,’ (3) per diem, namely daily
fees for medical treatment during hospitalisation, or (4)
per case payment. The latter is based on the Diagnostic
Related Group (DRG) mechanism [11], which determines
the average cost of defined episodes of care in hospital
before the patient receives treatment. This facilitates pro-
spective costing for the HMO, and the provider may ei-
ther gain or lose income depending on how efficiently
the patient is treated.
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the employee, a spouse and four biological children
below the age of 18 years. As such, polygamous house-
holds need to make additional payments. Additional
children can be added for additional cost but those over
18 in full time education are covered under the students’
scheme.
Gate-keeping is a feature of the NHIS as the HCP is
the first point of contact before referrals are made to
secondary or tertiary care. The benefits package covers:
out-patient care & consumables, prescribed drugs and
diagnostic tests covered by the National Essential Drugs
List and Diagnostic Test Lists, antenatal and maternity
care for up to four live births, preventive care including
immunization, consultations with specialists, hospital
care in a standard ward, eye examination and care ex-
cluding the provision of spectacles and contact lenses,
prostheses (artificial limbs), dental care and pain relief
[5]. Treatment excluded from coverage includes anti-
retroviral drugs (but these are covered by the National
Action Committee for AIDS (NACA)), care for terminal
illnesses such as cancer and AIDS, and chronic health
problems such as diabetes, renal dialysis and hyperten-
sion [5,6].
The USSHIP element of the NHIS is a non-profit health
insurance programme covering occupation-based User
Groups (UGs) with common economic activities and
administered by a Board of Trustees. UGs must contain at
least 500 members to ensure adequate pooling of financial
resources. These are shown in Figure 1 as vertically inte-
grated from revenue-raising to purchasing and horizontally
segmented. In relation to revenue-raising, participants pay
a flat monthly rate with contributions depending on the
health package chosen by members of the UG, which is
based on their health needs. As with HMOs, pooling takes
place within funds but not between them and therefore
membership influences the degree of risk sharing that is
possible. Health care benefits are delivered by accredited
providers, as in the case of the formal sector.
The RCSHIP is also a non-profit health insurance
programme for a cohesive group of households or indi-
viduals (including retirees) that form a community. The
scheme is run by its members using the same manage-
ment structure as the USSHIP element with vertically
integrated, horizontally segmented UGs as shown in
Figure 1. Based on the model of Health Mutual Associa-
tions (HMAs), the scheme can encompass Community-
Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organisations
(FBOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
Civil-Society Organisations (CSOs). Members of the spe-
cified community, based on their health needs, acquire
NHIS accreditation and then choose the health care
benefits with contributions being made in cash, paid as
a flat monthly rate or by means of instalments. Thiscontribution rate will depend on the health package
chosen by members of the UG.
In terms of equity, both the USSHIP and RCSHIP offer
promising ways of scaling up NHIS participation outside
the compulsory formal sector scheme. However, it should
be noted that both are voluntary schemes based on variable
financing arrangements and benefits packages and require
a high degree of self-management and administration. The
benefits packages are not fully comprehensive, which
means some members will not be able to access care for
excluded conditions. The main impact, therefore, is to in-
crease horizontal equity for some participants in financing
and provision, but reduce vertical equity for others.
NHIS implementation and factors affecting equity
Partly because of the phased implementation of the NHIS
in Nigeria, enrolment appears to be rather sluggish as in
2011, there were only 5.3 million Nigerians (about 3.5% of
the population) enrolled and the principal participants
were those in the FSHIP element, including 600,000 preg-
nant women and children under the Maternal and Child
Health (MCH) project [32]. Although accurate member-
ship data for each of the three programmes are difficult to
confirm, total participation, consistent with the above
data, is estimated to be at approximately 5 million [22]. A
steady increase in HMOs has been observed and there are
now 62 that have been accredited and registered, with
more applications being processed. In 2012 there were
5,949 accredited HCPs and over 4 million identity cards
had been issued [5]. The system is therefore making varia-
ble progress but some recent initiatives regarding external
sources and new legislation are anticipated to move the
situation forward and are addressed in the discussion. In
the following sections, evidence from the eight included
studies in Table 2 are summarised in conjunction with
each aspect of equity that was addressed by them.
Equity in financing
Four studies assessed equity in financing concerning the
consequences of a reliance on OOP payments. Multiple
sources of finance were shown to be utilised by surgical
patients in Ngo [27] in that respondents had used: per-
sonal savings (71%), contributions from family members
(49%), organisations (31%), loans (16%) and sale of pro-
perty (30%). OOP spending among a sample of civil ser-
vants in Osum State also showed that it was as high as
74% [33]. Another study of rural dwellers in Anambra
and Enugu states [4] found that malaria was the most
common illness facing households, with strong evidence
that the effect of OOP expenditures falls disproportion-
ately on poorer socio-economic groups and varies accor-
ding to geographical location.
The negative consequences for equity because of high
OOP payments can be seen from a study of government
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63.6% of OOP users had difficulties obtaining quality
health care; 47.7% used self-medication, 28.4% delayed
seeking treatment, 17.1% used herbalists, and 6.8%
ignored their illness [34].
Equity in access
Five studies reported empirical findings regarding access
to health care. A survey of dentists in Lagos State [35]
found that 61% had only a fair knowledge of the NHIS
but 76.6% believed it would expand access to dental care
by improving affordability and availability of services.
However, 74% had concerns about the quality of NHIS
treatment currently available.
In a study of rural surgical patients by Dienye et al. [27],
only 3% of respondents had knowledge of the NHIS but
84% were willing to enrol. In another survey of civil ser-
vants in Osun State by Olugbenga-Bello and Adebempi
[33] the authors found low levels of knowledge about the
NHIS and only 0.3% had actually benefited from it. How-
ever, 52.5% said they would participate in it.
Another study by Oyibo [34], which addressed the
issue of access constraints for government employees in
Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, found that NHIS enrolees had
little difficulty in accessing health care compared with
those relying on OOP payments. One large-scale study
of formal sector employees in Lagos [9] found that
only11% saw cost as a barrier to membership, but 36%
had not heard of the NHIS even though membership
among them rose from 4.5% in 2000 to 31.6% in 2006.
Gender, age, income, marital status, family size, educa-
tion and occupation were significant explanatory vari-
ables regarding access to health care through NHIS
participation. The authors made the point that participa-
tion could be improved through compliance with com-
pulsory enrolment for the formal sector, and indicated
that the informal sector requires an NHIS awareness
campaign as membership is not mandatory.
In terms of access being hindered by payment
mechanisms, while capitation payments were found to
be reliable, some studies reported delays in providers re-
ceiving authorization to offer services to clients using
fee-for-service payments. Providers had also experienced
delays in receiving approval to refer patients across
levels of care [36].
Concern was raised about the service provided by
HMOs and providers by a sample of employees in the
formal sector [9]. A study by Onwujekwe and Onoka
[37] also revealed that rural dwellers and poorer socio-
economic groups mostly accessed low-level and informal
providers.
Evidence on the satisfaction levels for NHIS partici-
pants was reported in a study by Mohamed et al. [38],
which surveyed FSHIP enrolees in Zaria-Nigeria. Highsatisfaction was expressed by a minority of 42% and fac-
tors such as income, length of employment and length of
enrolment slightly influenced satisfaction. Marital status,
general awareness of contributions and benefits signifi-
cantly and positively influenced clients’ satisfaction.
NHIS (Ghana)
The main NHIS elements of the Ghanaian healthcare sys-
tem are shown in shaded boxes of Figure 2. The NHIS
can make use of three types of health insurance scheme:
the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS),
the Private Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (PMHIS),
and the Private Commercial Health Insurance Schemes
(PCHIS). The Scheme’s objectives, as implemented cen-
trally and locally by the National Health Insurance Au-
thority (NHIA), are to ensure access to basic health care
services to all residents of Ghana with the following objec-
tives: (1) register, license and regulate health insurance
schemes, (2) supervise the operations of health insurance
schemes, (3) grant accreditation to healthcare providers,
(4) monitor compliance, and (5) perform other functions
conferred upon it under Act 650 and Regulations 1809. In
2010, there were 145 NHIA-accredited DMHISs and 574
accredited providers across the 10 States of Ghana (see
Figure 2 for categories). The NHIA was also reviewing
applications from the private health insurance schemes in
2012 [7]; at the time of publication some PMHISs are fully
operational within the NHIS [39].
Starting with revenue-raising, it can be seen that the
central plank of the system is the National Health Insu-
rance Fund (NHIF), which pools funding revenues from
a number of sources as follows:
 Government of Ghana (GoG) - derived from
taxation (direct and indirect), which includes
subsidies for those exempted from premiums
 2.5% National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL)
 2.5% Social Security and National Insurance Trust
(SSNIT) as deductions at source from formal sector
employees
Other funding includes returns from investment, DF
(as shown in the arrow of Figure 2) and premiums col-
lected at the State level for non-formal sector employees.
Revenues from the NHIF are then used to provide a
‘reinsurance mechanism’ for the DMHISs [25] and pre-
miums for exempt groups, which are: (1) SSNIT contri-
butors, (2) SSNIT pensioners, (3) people aged 70 years
and above, (4) children under 18 years, (5) indigents
(those who are poor with no source of income or fixed
abode). An ID card facilitates access to services after a
specified waiting period.
Full time students over 18 years are required to pay the
minimum informal sector premium to obtain benefits.
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SSNIT contributors must also pay a premium set for the
informal sector. In 2012, the informal sector premiums
ranged from GHC7.2 to 48.0 (US$ 3.8-25.3; 2012 values)
per annum and are intended to be determined by the go-
verning board of each DMHIS. In theory this should mean
that premiums in the informal sector are progressive but
there have been difficulties in determining accurate in-
come figures. Therefore, flat rates have been commonly
applied, which has meant this element of revenue-raising
has been shown to be regressive [20].
The husband and all the wives in polygamous house-
holds have to be covered by NHIS for their children to
be registered but, unlike the limited number of children
in the Nigerian system, there is no limit of children per
couple in Ghana. The system is generous as members do
not pay any co-payments or deductibles.
The pooling of funds affords some sharing of risks
among members but there is no risk-equalisation mecha-
nism between the individual DMHISs. The NHIS secreta-
riat allocates funds to DMHISs based on the number of
SSNIT registered members as well as indigent members
that have registered. Taxes are centrally collected, pooled
and allocated to regional and district levels using a needs-
based resource allocation formula [1]. As such, the issue
of vertical equity is at least partially dealt with in relation
to pooling within government agencies that purchase
health care in the ten States of Ghana.
As shown in Figure 2, the NHIS separates the purcha-
sing and provision functions. The DMHISs reimburse
providers on a fee-for-service principle, based on the
Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings (G-DRGs) and a
drug tariff list [25]. Public and some not-for-profit private
(e.g. Christian Health Association of Ghana) facilities are
allocated budgets and staff are paid salaries. Private for-
profit practitioners are paid on a fee-for-service basis,
where applicable, through OOP payments [1].
In terms of provision, the NHIA mandates a pre-
defined benefits package that covers ‘95% of the disease
burden in Ghana’ [7]. Services must be obtained at
accredited facilities, which utilise gate-keeping between
primary and secondary/tertiary care. In contrast to the
Nigerian NHIS, the basic benefit package is the same for
all DMHISs and membership categories. Like Nigeria,
however, there are similar exclusions, including: (1) can-
cers other than cervical and breast cancers, (2) dialysis
for chronic renal failure, (3) services covered under go-
vernment vertical programs (including immunization,
family planning and antiretroviral drugs), (4) drugs not
listed on the NHIS Drug list, and (5) HIV/AIDS.
Every DMHIS establishes contracts with accredited
providers to deliver services to its members, and reim-
burses providers after submission of claims for services.
As with the Nigerian NHIS, the NHIS of Ghana hassome limitations with regard to vertical and horizontal
equity in access due to the exclusions of cover for some
conditions.
NHIS implementation and factors affecting equity
In rather stark contrast to Nigeria, NHIS membership in
Ghana has been rising sharply since its implementation.
In 2007 membership was 35% [8] and by June, 2010,
66.4% of the population were registered (15,555,816
people) and there were 5,000 accredited providers. While
SSNIT members accounted for about 6.4% (a figure that
looks similar to the predominantly formal sector NHIS
membership in Nigeria) 29.6% were in the informal adult
sector, 48.9% were under 18 year-olds, 6.5% were 70 years
or more, 6.7% were expectant mothers and 2.3% were in-
digent poor [7]. These data clearly show a substantial level
of success in expanding membership when compared with
Nigeria. The eight studies included in the review for
Ghana, as shown in Table 3, are outlined in the following.
Equity in financing
Three studies specifically addressed the issue of equity
in financing in Ghana. A study by Akazili et al. [20] is
highly informative to both Ghana and Nigeria as it used
empirical analyses of households and other sources,
coupled with well-established methods to determine the
degree of progressivity in different categories of revenue-
raising. The overall finding was that financing is progres-
sive because of the major role of taxes. The NHI levy
was found to be mildly progressive as were formal sector
NHI payroll deductions. Informal sector NHI contribu-
tions, however, were found to be regressive. In spite of
the emergence of the NHIS, OOP payments (45% of
total health expenditure), were confirmed as being regres-
sive. At the time of the analysis, NHIS premiums only
accounted for 5% of total health care funding. Among
other recommendations, the authors called for measures
to expand the informal sector, possibly through a greater
reliance on taxation, and the prepayment pool needs to in-
crease in order to enhance budgetary allocations.
A study by Nguyen et al. [8] found evidence of the fi-
nancial protection effect of the NHIS in that payments
for care and uncovered drugs and tests occurred in the
NHIS, but at significantly lower levels than the unin-
sured. The effect was strong among the poorest in the
sample. However, OOP payments were not eliminated
by social insurance programmes. Another study by Wit-
ter and Garshong [30] confirmed the reliance of the
NHIS on tax-based funding at 70-75% of total funding
and that the exempted group is substantial at about 30%.
There was also evidence, however, of a growth in dis-
tressed DMHISs as the NHIA has been required to
make further reinsurance payments to meet gaps bet-
ween revenues and claims. In contrast to the findings of
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to be regressive.
Equity in access
The issue of equity in access to health care in Ghana was
addressed by six studies. The pro-rich bias and need to lo-
cate the poor for exemption was explored in two studies by
Aryeetey et al. [40,41] who evaluated the equity, efficiency
and feasibility of different strategies. They found that the
cost to the government of exempting one poor individual
from premiums was quite high (US$15.87 to US$95.44)
and that means testing (MT) of wealth and geographic tar-
geting (GT) were the optimal mechanisms depending on
the setting (poverty level and rural/urban characteristics).
These studies highlight the need of similar countries that
require identification and exemptions of the poor in SHI
programmes if universal coverage is to be achieved.
Two studies by Jehu-Appiah et al. [25,42] involved sur-
veys of over 3,000 households and their perceptions of the
NHIS according to insured or uninsured status, and the
demand for membership according to socio-economic sta-
tus. The principal findings were that scheme factors such
as price, convenience, provider attitudes, peer pressure
and the benefits package are relevant in NHIS member-
ship and retention. The uninsured were also found to be
more negative than members with regard to these factors
and there is evidence of inequity in enrolment in the
NHIS according to socio-economic factors as clear diffe-
rences exist between the rich and poor. A study by
Sarpong et al. [43] also confirmed these findings among
households in the Ashanti region of Ghana where, among
the 38% enrolled in the NHIS 21% were low, 43% middle
and 60% high socio-economic status households and that
the association was significant. The work undertaken by
Witter et al. [30] also provided supporting evidence that
membership of the NHIS is pro-rich and pro-urban and
that there is ‘squeezing out’ of non-members from access
to health care.
In terms of improved outcomes through better access,
a study by Mensah et al. [44] is of much interest as it
evaluated the effect of the NHIS on MDGs 4 and 5 in
women of child-bearing age in the administrative regions
of Brong Ahafo and Upper East. Analysis of 400 NHIS
members and 1,600 non-NHIS members showed that
women enrolled in the NHIS were more likely to receive
prenatal care, deliver at a hospital, have their deliveries
attended by trained health professionals, and experience
less birth complications. A study by Nguyen et al. [8]
also identified the need for improvements in supply-side
incentives and the quality of care.
Discussion
We commenced this study by re-affirming standard defi-
nitions of equity in health care, and outlining the chosenanalytical approach. The principal reason for choosing the
WHO framework [12] was that it facilitates a means of
diagrammatically representing how the NHIS of each
country fits into other elements of the healthcare system
with regard to the common functions of revenue-raising,
pooling, purchasing and provision. These methods enabled
us to capture the well-recognised complexity and fragmen-
tation of health care in Nigeria and Ghana. Although the
full analytical framework includes other common elements
of stewardship and resource generation, which are vertically
integrated throughout any healthcare system [12], these
were not the focus of our attention although our findings
have encompassed stewardship of each NHIS to a limited
degree.
Our analysis of health and economic outcomes at a
macro level over the period 2000–2010 has captured some
informative trends pre- and post-NHIS implementation.
Nigeria and Ghana are both making positive progress and
have transitioned to LMIC status, with GDP growth rates
well above those of most developed countries. This sug-
gests a growing capacity to fund and deliver health care,
which is confirmed by comparable per capita health care
spending for both countries. However, as a share of GDP
both countries spend less than half the OECD mean,
which implies that there is room for greater increases in
health spending that could drive equity improvements in
health care.
Both countries have also steadily improved their health
outcomes over the period examined but the findings re-
veal strong inequalities, with a sustained or growing ad-
vantage for Ghana. Using the raw data of Table 1 for
2000 and 2010, respectively, it can be determined that
life expectancy in Ghana was 20.8% and 23.5% higher
(males), and 25.5% and 25% higher (females); infant
mortality was 44.8% lower and 43.2% lower in Ghana;
under-5 year mortality was 47% lower and 48% lower in
Ghana; the prevalence of HIV was 41% lower and 50%
lower in Ghana; the incidence of TB was 11.6% lower
and 35.3% lower in Ghana. However, improvements in
health outcomes cannot be attributed solely to the
efforts of the healthcare system as health production
theory indicates that other factors influencing health
outcomes include environment, lifestyle and human biol-
ogy [11]. This is an important consideration as per capita
spending on health in Nigeria has been very similar or
higher over the period 2000–2010 (Table 1), which may
also suggest greater efficiency in the Ghanaian healthcare
system. In this respect, the MDGs of the United Nations
are clearly important as they provide motivation to
improve health indicators through targets that seek to
eradicate the underlying causes of premature mortality, in-
cluding poverty. MDGs now form an integral part of na-
tional development policy for Nigeria and Ghana as
reflected in their regular MDG reports [18,19]. Differences
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ding greater inequalities across the Nigerian population,
were confirmed in the WHO Report of 2000 [23].
The issue of equity in fund raising is clearly relevant
regarding health outcomes as the findings of this study
show it has an impact on access to health care. The find-
ings for macro-level data reveal more beneficial equity
developments in Ghana pre- and post-NHIS implementa-
tion; OOP health expenditure as a percentage of private
health expenditure decreased by 14% in Ghana while in
Nigeria there was an increase of 2%; public health expend-
iture as a share of total health expenditure increased in
Ghana by 19% while in Nigeria there was a modest 5% in-
crease. As a share of total expenditure the greater reliance
on this regressive form of funding is confirmed by figures
of 65% for Nigeria and 45% for Ghana. Removing such a
strong reliance on OOP expenditure is key to improving
equity in financing [1,20] - the WHO indicates this should
less than 15–20% of total health expenditures in order to
prevent financial catastrophe regarding access to health
care [3], which both countries are clearly well short of.
The NHIS of Nigeria and Ghana explicitly seek to pro-
vide prepayment protection against the ill-effects of
OOP payments by widening membership. In this regard
we have observed a very substantial difference in suc-
cess, with Ghana achieving 65% and Nigeria only 3.5%
population coverage. In discussing this difference it is
worth considering the challenges the Nigerian NHIS
faces through its three-tier arrangements for the formal,
urban self-employed and rural programmes. While the
formal sector programme is (theoretically) statutory and
easier to implement through payroll deductions, the
other programmes are voluntary and broadly based on
the CBHI model, which is to be scaled up with the
advantages of minimum membership (to assure suffi-
cient funding and risk sharing), regulated administration
and NHIS-accredited providers. The general aim is to
bring existing and new ‘user groups’ under the NHIS
umbrella. Additional merits of this model include its
not-for-profit basis and possibly increased social cohe-
sion and success when groups with a common interest
come together, but the known issues of low participation
rates, a limited benefits package, adverse selection (of
high risks) and the use of regressive contributions make
its expansion potential problematic. The promised good
management provided under the NHIS will therefore be
essential, especially in remote regions with high rates
of poverty. Widening membership through targeted
exemptions for more sub-groups in Nigeria using gen-
eral taxation, as is more prominent in Ghana, may be
necessary if substantial moves towards universal health
care are to be achieved.
The common feature of donor funding raises some
potential conflicts of interest and adverse effects concerning equity because, while it may bolster access to
health care at various levels of the system (Figures 1 and 2),
it may also be transient and poorly targeted. According
to the WHO, it also has the capacity to dampen the
supply-side efforts of governments as they may be
unwilling either to spend more on health or do not ac-
knowledge that they have the capacity to expand prepay-
ment and pooling systems [3]. Our findings also indicate
that it is more generous towards Ghana at about three
times higher than Nigeria. Interestingly, however, it has
recently been announced that the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) has signed a US$2.3 million agree-
ment with the Nigerian government that is aimed at
speeding up the development of health insurance. The
Government’s aim is to fast-track the enrolment of the
majority of Nigerians into the NHIS [45]. While this is
encouraging in the short-term, increased health care ex-
penditure from the Government must surely be a more
sustainable means of widening membership.
The findings of the review for Nigeria uncovered mixed
messages regarding the attributes of the NHIS but clearly
confirmed the negative impacts of OOP expenditure, which
limits or causes delays in access, and encourages the use of
potentially ineffective alternatives or self-denial of treat-
ment. NHIS membership exhibits a clear urban/rural div-
ide in uptake and socio-economic factors are significant in
terms of participation and therefore access. Encouragingly,
however, there is a good level of willingness to participate
in the NHIS, especially in rural areas where it is hindered
by a lack of knowledge regarding the details and benefits of
the NHIS. The evidence confirms that the Nigerian govern-
ment needs to do more in terms of advertising and pro-
moting the NHIS in remote parts of the country to expand
membership. A major issue affecting equity in access is that
the benefits packages for the three programmes that consti-
tute the NHIS are not uniform and more comprehensive
coverage is provided in the formal sector.
The review findings for Ghana reveal a number of
advantages with respect to equity compared with Nigeria.
In addition to its rapid increase in membership, equity in
access is enhanced through clearly-defined exempted
groups that are funded from general taxation. There are
also financial protection effects and improved access to
health care with some evidence of improved health out-
comes. The issues that adversely affect equity include the
need to identify and promote membership for the rural
poor, dealing with the pro-urban and pro-rich member-
ship, and the presence of distressed DHMISs, which may
partly be the result of moral hazard as there are no (or
minimal) co-payments to dampen demand to partly con-
trol costs [11]. Another advantage concerning provision
for Ghana comes from the fact that the benefits package is
the same for all members, which gives Ghana a clear ad-
vantage in equity regarding access and provision, but it
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tical equity in particular.
In spite of Ghana being seen as a ‘leading light’ in this
study and more generally in the literature, a recent report
from Oxfam has generated much debate as it questions
the coverage and benefits claims regarding Ghana’s NHIS
[46]. Early assessments of the NHIS in Ghana also found
cases of NHIS card holders experiencing long delays for
treatment, being required to make unofficial additional
user charges, and receiving poorer quality care [8].
The results of our literature review revealed a number
of informative additional studies of Sub-Saharan African
countries with regard to equity in financing and initiatives
to achieve universal health care. In assessing the success
of the NHIS in Nigeria, for example, Nnamuchi [47] likens
it to a ‘white elephant’ and argues that it lacks the requisite
policy and legal frameworks for realising many of the goals
it sets out to accomplish, and that re-calibration is neces-
sary. Sambo and colleagues [48] report opinions among
high level policy makers in Africa that support the fin-
dings of the present study as they confirm the predomi-
nance of OOP spending, underdeveloped prepaid health
financing mechanisms, large informal sectors vis-a-vis
small formal sectors, unpredictability and non-alignment
of the majority of donor funds with national health prio-
rities, and the need to allocate at least 15% of the national
budget to health care.
The work of Akazil and colleagues [20] is deserving of
particular acknowledgement as their comprehensive study
of equity in financing in Ghana serves as a model for
much-needed analyses of other Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. The work of McIntyre and colleagues [1] has been
particularly beneficial in the present study as it provides
in-depth analyses of Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania, in
seeking a path from ‘fragmentation to universal health
care.’ The WHO also clearly acts as a principal driver of
universal health care through its numerous reports and as
a final overview we would echo its recommendations for
countries such as Nigeria and Ghana to: (1) raise sufficient
funds in an equitable, efficient and sustainable manner, (2)
reduce financial barriers through affordable access and
equitable and efficient pooling, and (3) use resources
wisely through their equitable and efficient use [3].
We believe that our study offers originality due to the
head-to-head comparison of two countries with differing
approaches and levels of achievement, with Nigeria having
perhaps the greatest potential to benefit. The application
of the WHO framework to assess healthcare system per-
formance is also a novel approach and we would argue a
fruitful method to represent healthcare systems with res-
pect to equity. We encourage its use in future studies of
this nature in order to make analyses easier to assimilate
for policy makers. In terms of limitations, whilst our re-
view of the literature was based on a systematic search ofelectronic databases, websites and included studies, we
have not explored the grey literature in detail. The two
diagrams of Nigeria and Ghana presented in this study
could also be developed further to improve their precision
and comprehensiveness.
Conclusions
Evidence from this study indicates healthy economic
growth to LMIC status for both Nigeria and Ghana, with
steady improvements in health indicators in recent years
but there is a clear and sustained advantage for Ghana.
Both countries have introduced NHISs with the aim of
reducing the reliance on OOP payments and are looking
for these systems to eventually provide universal health
care for their citizens. Whilst progress is being made in
both countries, the results strongly suggest that equity
in relation to financing and access are weaker in Nigeria
compared with Ghana. Nigeria particularly needs to take
steps to expand membership outside the formal sector,
possibly through exemptions using general taxation as
has been more widely adopted in Ghana. Nigeria appears
to have been receiving lower levels of donor funding but
the latest arrangement with the IFC has offered greater
expansion potential of NHIS membership. Nigeria
clearly has the capacity to expand its own internal
spending to achieve greater integration of its healthcare
system through the NHIS. Heavy burdens of poverty,
disease, remote rural settings and variability in provision
across both Nigeria and Ghana present substantial chal-
lenges. Ghana’s success story is encouraging but has to
be tempered by the high number of exemptions through
taxation and the threat of moral hazard. Some recent
evidence questions the level of success actually achieved.
The WHO methods of healthcare system analysis, as ap-
plied in this study, are informative in this area of study
and could be beneficially expanded in future analyses.
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